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INTRODUCTION
Federal and state governments use the power of eminent domain to
appropriate private property for public projects.1 This type of
acquisition—commonly referred to as a “taking” or “condemnation”—
requires that the government use the taken property for a public purpose
and pay the landowner just compensation for his loss.2 The Constitution
does not define just compensation, leaving the courts to develop and
apply methods for determining what compensation is “just.”3
A “partial taking” occurs when the public project does not require
the condemnor to take the landowner’s entire parcel.4 Under these
circumstances, the landowner-condemnee may receive just
compensation that includes the value of the part taken, as well as any
severance damages5 to the remainder parcel that are caused by the
taking. Courts primarily enlist one of two calculation methods to
measure just compensation.6 The “before and after” method awards the
landowner the difference between the market value of the property
before the taking and the market value of the remainder parcel after the
taking.7 Alternatively, compensation under the “value plus damages”
approach awards the value of the part taken plus net damages to the

1 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment confers the equivalent power to the
states. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see generally 3-8 PHILIP NICHOLS, ET AL., NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.01 (Matthew Bender, 3d ed. 2013).
2 See U.S. v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943).
3 Id. at 373–74; see generally Robert Kratovil & Frank J. Harrison, Jr., Eminent Domain—
Policy and Concept, 42 CAL. L. REV. 596, 597 (1954); Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of
Eminent Domain, 84 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, No. 3, 473, 474 (1976).
4 See United States v. Banisadr Bldg. Joint Venture, 65 F.3d 374, 378 (4th Cir. 1995)
(defining a partial taking); see generally 4A-14 NICHOLS, supra note 1, at § 14.01. In a partial
taking, the remainder parcel constitutes the part of the parcel that the government does not take,
which the landowner retains ownership.
5 Miller, 317 U.S. at 376. Severance damages compensate for the diminution in value of the
remainder directly caused by the taking itself and by the use of the land taken. United States v.
38.60 Acres of Land, 625 F.2d 196, 198–99 (8th Cir. 1980); see generally, 4A NICHOLS, supra
note 1, at § 14.02. Severance damages may include such factors as loss of access (see State, Dep’t
of Highway v. Anderson, 356 So. 2d 1086, 1087–88 (La. Ct. App. 1978)), change in highest and
best use of remainder parcel (see State Through Dep’t of Highways v. Hoyt, 284 So. 2d 763, 766
(La. 1973)), or impact of public project on zoning of the remainder parcel (see Duval Prods., Inc.
v. City of Tampa, 307 So. 2d 493, 493–94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)).
6 See generally 4A-14 NICHOLS, supra note 1, at § 14.02.
7 See United States v. 8.41 Acres of Land, 680 F.2d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing United
States v. Virginia Elec. Co., 365 U.S. 624, 630 (1961)).
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remainder parcel.8
In most cases, the approaches reach an equivalent award; however,
these valuation methods reach divergent results in certain cases in
which the remainder parcel’s increased value exceeds the value of the
part taken and the landowner’s net damages.9 Some courts permit this
increase in market value to offset the compensation award for the part
taken.10 In that event, the before and after rule would award zero dollars
to the landowner because the value received from the taking exceeds the
landowner’s losses.11 By contrast, the value plus damages rule would
compensate the landowner for the part taken under the same facts, and
simply award zero severance damages for the remainder parcel.12
Consider the following hypothetical: A partial taking occurs when
the city condemns one acre, valued at $5,000, of a landowner’s five acre
parcel in order to construct a highway. The taking causes a drainage
issue on the remainder parcel for which the landowner seeks severance
damages of $1,000. However, the market value of the remainder parcel
also increases as a result of the taking by $2,000 per acre, or $8,000
total. This increase in market value exceeds both the value of the parcel
taken and the damages sought for the drainage issue. Consequently, the
landowner has not lost any monetary value as a result of the taking,
notwithstanding the loss of part of his parcel. Three different
compensation awards are possible under these facts. In each instance,
the landowner would retain the $8,000 increase in value to the
remainder parcel.
Outcome 1: “No Credit for Increased Value”: The court disregards
any increased market value to the remainder parcel caused by the partial
taking and awards the landowner the market value of the part taken,
plus any damages suffered by the remainder. The landowner receives
$6,000 in compensation.13
Outcome 2: Before and After: The court assesses the parcel as a
8 See State ex rel. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm’n v. McDonald’s Corp., 872 S.W.2d
108, 111 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing value plus damages rule as another method to reach
compensation award) (citing State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n. v. Kendrick, 383 S.W.2d 740,
745 (Mo. 1964)).
9 “Net damages” refers to the value of any severance damages suffered by the remainder
parcel less any offsettable benefits caused by the taking. See 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain §
324 (2014) (citing cases that offset special benefits against damages to the remainder).
10 See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 558 (1898) (federal eminent domain law permits offset
of benefits against severance damages and compensation for part taken); see generally 8A
NICHOLS, supra note 1, at § G16.02. The condemnor bears the burden of proving benefits or
increase in market value to the remainder. See Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd.
P’ship, 71 S.W.3d 18, 46–47 (Tex. App. 2002); see generally 3-8A NICHOLS, supra note 1, at
§ 8A.02.
11 See UNIF. EMINENT DOMAIN CODE Art. X § 1002 cmt. (1974).
12 Id.
13 The “No Credit for Increased Value” outcome awards the landowner compensation of
$6,000, which includes the value of the part taken ($5,000) plus the damages for the drainage
problem ($1,000). See infra Part III.A for a discussion of this approach.
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whole and compares the value of the entire parcel before the taking with
the value of the parcel after the taking. Thus, any increase in market
value may offset the entire award, including compensation for the parcel
taken. The landowner receives $0 in compensation.14
Outcome 3: Value Plus Damages: The court accounts for the
increase in market value to the remainder but only as an offset against
severance damages. This approach requires payment for the part taken
in all cases. The landowner receives $5,000 in compensation for the
parcel taken and $0 in severance damages.15
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently encountered this
compensation issue in the 2013 case of Borough of Harvey Cedars v.
Karan,16 in which the court announced a “market value rule” for
measuring compensation.17 However, the application of this rule
remains uncertain. In future cases, the market value rule can be applied
under either the before and after method or the value plus damages
method because Harvey Cedars permits future courts to determine
which method is more practical for a particular case.18
This Note suggests that the goals the Harvey Cedars court sought
to achieve—including reduced windfalls and greater certainty in the
law19—would best be achieved by applying the market value rule as
adopted in California, which follows a value plus damages approach
and requires payment for the part taken.20 Part I of this Note introduces
the Harvey Cedars case. Part II provides a historical background to
partial takings cases and a discussion of the special benefits doctrine, a
14 The “Full Credit for Increased Value” outcome considers the $8,000 increase in value to
the remainder parcel to offset the total compensation of $6,000 (Value of the Part Taken ($5,000)
plus Damages for the Drainage Problem ($1,000)). The landowner receives a net value increase
of $2,000 as a result of the taking (Credit for Increased Value to Remainder Parcel ($8,000)
minus Compensation ($6,000)). The landowner thus receives $0 as compensation for the taking.
See infra Part III for a discussion of various methods that reach this outcome.
15 The “Credit Only Against Severance Damages” outcome considers the increase in value to
the remainder parcel, but rather than award $0 for the taking, this outcome guarantees
compensation for the part taken. The landowner thus receives $5,000 for the taking. See infra Part
III.D for a discussion of the New York and California methods, which require compensation for
the part taken.
16 70 A.3d 524 (N.J. 2013).
17 Id. at 543 (opining that all reasonably calculable benefits accruing to remainder as a result
of the public project that increase market value of property should offset the condemnation award,
regardless of whether the community shares in these benefits).
18 Id. at 543 n.8 (endorsing the before and after approach for future cases unless value plus
damages rule provides more practical approach). New Jersey courts have used both the before and
after rule and the value plus damages rule in partial takings cases. See Village of South Orange v.
Alden Corp., 365 A.2d 469, 472 (N.J. 1976) (discussing the use of both valuation approaches in
partial takings by New Jersey courts).
19 See Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 544 (injured landowner should receive just compensation
for his loss, but such compensation does not entitle him to a windfall at public expense); id. at
540 (discounting terms special and general benefits as obscuring rather than illuminating
calculation of just compensation).
20 L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809, 824 (Cal. 1997); see
also infra Part III.D for a discussion of the California approach.
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type of compensation method that emerged as a compromise position to
compensation to better protect condemnees. Part III surveys the various
compensation methods used by several state courts. Part IV discusses
the advantages and disadvantages of these approaches and proposes that
New Jersey courts apply the market value rule under the value plus
damages calculation—even in cases where the remainder’s value
increases to a greater extent than net damages incurred—in order to
avoid the negative consequences associated with zero compensation
under the before and after rule.
I.

THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT DECIDES BOROUGH OF HARVEY
CEDARS V. KARAN

The New Jersey case of Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan
involved a landowner who sought compensation and damages for the
partial taking of his beachfront property by the Borough of Harvey
Cedars (the Borough).21 The partial taking involved a perpetual
easement22 to construct a sand dune as part of a beach replenishment
project in Long Beach Island, New Jersey. Pursuant to
recommendations of a 1999 feasibility report, the Army Corps of
Engineers embarked on the project, which involved the construction of
coastal sand dunes, to protect the island from damage caused by coastal
storms and hurricanes.23 The Borough acquired easements to construct
these dunes from sixty-six landowners voluntarily,24 but the Borough
was forced to enact an eminent domain ordinance25 to condemn the

21
22

Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 526.
An easement grants an individual the right to use another’s land (affirmative easement) or
restricts a landowner from using his land in a certain way that may harm his neighbors (negative
easement). See JESSE DUKEMINIER, ET AL., PROPERTY 767 (7th ed. 2010). In this case, the
Borough acquired an affirmative easement through its exercise of the eminent domain power in
order to construct the sand dune on the taken portion of the Karans’ property. Harvey Cedars, 70
A.3d at 526.
23 Pursuant to recommendations of a 1999 feasibility report, the Army Corps of Engineers
(the Corps) embarked on a beach replenishment project in Long Beach Island, New Jersey,
involving the construction of twenty-two-feet-high sand dunes along the coastline to protect the
island from the damage of coastal storms and hurricanes. Long Beach Island Shore Protection
Project, STATE OF N.J. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., ENG’G & CONSTR., http://www.nj.gov/dep/ec/
lbi_project.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2013). The Corps, in conjunction with the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection, were to carry out the project with the municipalities of
Long Beach Island, working to obtain easements on coastline properties in order to construct the
dunes. Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 527–28.
24 Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 527–28.
25 The legislature maintains the discretion to determine procedures for exercising the eminent
domain power, subject to the limitations of the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see
also 6-24 NICHOLS, supra note 1, at § 24.06. A state charter or statute conferring eminent domain
power to a municipal body often requires that a condemnation proceeding be authorized by
adoption of an ordinance, resolution, or formal order. See id. at § 24.12.
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necessary property from sixteen holdouts26 who were unwilling to
voluntarily contribute their land to the project.
In November 2008, the Borough initiated a condemnation
proceeding27 against the Karans, one of the sixteen holdouts, after the
parties failed to negotiate an amount of compensation for the
easement.28 At trial, the landowners argued that the twenty-two-feethigh sand dune obstructed the beachfront property’s panoramic ocean
view, diminishing the value of the property.29 On the other hand, an
expert for the Borough testified that the landowners obtained a
monetary benefit from the added storm protection of the sand dune.30
The trial judge used the special benefits doctrine to consider the
nature of the benefit of additional storm protection31 and determined as
a matter of law that the storm protection could not offset the
landowners’ award.32 The Appellate Division affirmed.33 The special
benefits doctrine was developed to distinguish between the types of
benefits caused by a taking:34 if the court deemed a benefit to be
“general,” arising from the public project, then the value of the benefit
could not be counted against the landowner; on the other hand, a benefit
found to be “special” to the property would offset the compensation
award.35 In this case, the trial court determined that any benefit derived
from the dunes constituted a general benefit to the entire community,
rather than a special benefit to the landowner’s property that could
factor into the calculation of just compensation.36
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reasoned that
because the sand dune would likely prevent complete destruction of the
property in the event of a major storm37—and thus tangibly increase the
26
27

N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 20:3-1–50 (West 2013); Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 527–28.
When a public body—or a private corporation invested with the power of eminent
domain—initiates a taking of private property, it institutes a court proceeding against the owners
of the desired lands. 6-24 NICHOLS, supra note 1, at § 24.05. The court must determine the value
of the parcel and authorize the condemnation of the parcel upon payment of just compensation.
Id.
28 The government generally must attempt to negotiate with the landowner for a purchase
price for the parcel taken, but if negotiations fail, the condemning body files a petition in court to
acquire the property. See DUKEMINIER, supra note 22, at 1081. The condemning body has the
burden of proving necessity of the taking, and a jury generally determines just compensation. Id.
29 Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 530. At trial, the expert for the condemnor testified that the loss
of the ocean view caused nominal damages of $300, while the landowners’ expert asserted a
$500,000 loss in value. Id.
30 Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 40 A.3d 75, 78–79 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
31 Id. at 82.
32 Id. at 79.
33 Id. at 84–85.
34 See, e.g., Sullivan v. N. Hudson Cnty. R.R. Co., 18 A. 689, 690 (N.J. 1889).
35 Harvey Cedars, 40 A.3d at 82.
36 Id. at 79.
37 Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 542 (N.J. 2013). The New Jersey
Supreme Court decided the Harvey Cedars case on July 8, 2013, less than one year following
Superstorm Sandy. While the opinion does not mention the storm, one may question the effect
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market value of the beachfront property—this benefit should offset the
compensation award to avoid granting the landowner a windfall.38 In
order to account for such a benefit, the court announced the market
value rule to measure compensation, which would require a jury to
consider all factors affecting the value of the property.39
Although the Supreme Court of New Jersey announced the market
value rule, the court did not decide whether the rule should be applied
under a before and after approach or a value plus damages approach.
Consequently, future courts maintain the discretion to decide which
method to use in a particular case, meaning that an injured landowner in
a New Jersey case would not necessarily receive compensation for the
parcel taken where the remainder parcel’s value exceeds net damages.
One New Jersey court could decide to use the before and after method
to award the landowner zero compensation in these types of cases.40 On
the other hand, another court in the state could apply the value plus
damages method, which would require payment to the landowner for
the part taken.41
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Railroad Appropriations

Different compensation methods in partial takings cases emerged
with the upsurge in takings by private corporations—particularly
railroads42—during the nineteenth century.43 Initially, railroad
companies sought to minimize the costs of public projects by claiming
that landowners who suffered a partial taking did not suffer any

that the storm had on the court’s analysis. The landowners’ property was left largely untouched
by Sandy, arguably because of the protection provided by the sand dune, and the landowners later
settled the case for $1 rather than try their chances with a post-Sandy jury. See Nicholas Huba,
Supreme Court: Beachfront Owners Can’t Cash In On Protective Dunes, ASBURY PARK PRESS
(Jul. 9, 2013), http://www.app.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/201307080410/NJNEWS/30708
0002; Marc Poirier, Partial Taking in the Dunes of New Jersey: The Harvey Cedars Case,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/10/
partial-taking-in-the-dunes-of-new-jersey-the-harvey-cedars-case.html.
38 Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 544.
39 Id. at 543–44.
40 See supra notes 11 and 14 and accompanying text.
41 See supra notes 12 and 15 and accompanying text.
42 Legislatures may confer the power of eminent domain on private corporations or persons in
order to facilitate public projects. See E. Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 821 (4th
Cir. 2004) (citing Miss. & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878))
(landowner possesses absolute right to compensation, applicable to any person or corporation to
whom legislature confers eminent domain power).
43 See Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 536 (noting railroad condemnation practices at turn of
century as period in which general and special benefits doctrine emerged); see generally LEWIS
ORGEL, 1 VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, 41–45 (2d ed. 1953).
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damages because the construction of the railroad increased the value of
the remainder parcel.44
During this period, several state courts’ decisions45 awarded the
landowner zero compensation for a partial taking by using the before
and after rule to calculate compensation, allowing railroad companies to
freely appropriate private property.46 The nineteenth century cases of
Alton and Sangamon Railroad Company v. Carpenter47 and San
Francisco, Alameda and Stockton Railroad Company v. Caldwell48 are
illustrative. The condemnor railroad in Alton asserted that an increase in
value to the remainder parcel caused by the taking should offset the
landowner’s compensation award.49 The Illinois Supreme Court agreed
on appeal.50 The opinion interpreted the state condemnation statute to
allow the court to consider all benefits caused by the taking in
measuring compensation.51 Thus, the general rise in property values
created by the taking in this case offset the landowner’s award.52 The
condemnor railroad company in Alameda argued for the same
outcome.53 The California Supreme Court also found for the railroad
company and held that the remainder parcel’s increased value resulting

44 See, e.g., Short v. Rochester & P. R.R. Co., 8 A. 596 (Pa. 1887) (noting that if property
would have brought a higher price after the railroad construction than before and this benefit
equals or exceeds damages, then defendant can recover nothing); Bohlman v. Green Bay & M.
Ry. Co., 40 Wis. 157, 160 (Wis. 1876) (noting that president of condemnor railroad testified that
condemnee did not suffer damages as a result of taking because condemnee’s land was worth
more with railroad than without); Peoria, Pekin & Jacksonville R.R. Co. v. Laurie, 63 Ill. 264,
266–68 (Ill. 1872) (affirming judgment of no damages in condemnation proceeding in which
condemnor railroad proffered evidence regarding benefit to remainder and showed landowner
suffered no damages as a result of taking); S.F., Alameda & Stockton R.R. Co. v. Caldwell, 31
Cal. 368 (Cal. 1866) (holding in favor of condemnor that just compensation may be paid in
benefits caused by taking and rejecting condemnee’s argument that only special benefits may
offset compensation); Alton and Sangamon R.R. Co. v. Carpenter, 14 Ill. 190 (Ill. 1852) (noting
that condemnor railroad requested jury instructions to award no damages if benefits exceeded
damages); Nicholson v. N.Y. & N.H.R. Co., 22 Conn. 74, 78–79 (Conn. 1852) (noting that
railroad condemnor offered evidence to show that the property had increased in value to a greater
extent than the landowner’s expenses).
45 See, e.g., Alton, 14 Ill. at 190; Alameda, 31 Cal. at 368; see also cases cited infra note 90
(awarding no damages under before and after rule).
46 See supra note 44; see generally Edward J. Connor, Jr., Valuation of Partial Taking In
Condemnation: A Need for Legislative Review, 2 PAC L.J. 116, 124 (1971) (discussing
California’s departure from “no credit for increased value” outcome of just compensation as an
initiative aimed primarily at numerous railroad acquisitions occurring during late nineteenth
century); Charles M. Haar & Barbara Hering, The Determination of Benefits in Land Acquisition,
51 CAL. L. REV. 833, 866 (1963) (describing series of New York cases that distinguished general
and special benefits to limit increase in value to remainder that offset compensation for railroads
takings).
47 Alton, 14 Ill. 190.
48 Alameda, 31 Cal. 368.
49 Alton and Sangamon R.R. Co., 14 Ill. at 191.
50 Id. at 192.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 191.
53 Alameda, 31 Cal. at 370.
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from railroad construction constituted just compensation. This opinion
reasoned that the Constitution does not mandate monetary payment for
a taking.54
Over time, this practice generated disapproval and motivated a
departure from the before and after rule in favor of compensation
methods that would award the landowner at least some compensation
for the parcel taken.55 Courts56 and legislatures57 began to either limit or
prohibit the offset of a remainder parcel’s increased value against
compensation. Specifically, those jurisdictions that permitted zero
compensation in Alton and Alameda responded with steps to end free
appropriations by railroad companies. The Illinois legislature enacted a
statute that required monetary compensation for the part taken,58 and the
California Supreme Court adopted the special benefits doctrine to limit
the types of benefits that could offset compensation.59
54
55

Id. at 374.
See, e.g., Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 536 (N.J. 2013) (noting
railroad condemnation practices at turn of century as period in which special benefits doctrine
emerged); see generally ORGEL, supra note 43, at 44–45.
56 See, e.g., Gallatin Valley Elec. Ry. v. Neible, 186 P. 689, 691–92 (Mont. 1919) (general
appreciation in value of properties surrounding railroad construction was not special benefit and
could not offset severance damages); Salt Lake & U. R.R. Co. v. Butterfield, 150 P. 931, 932
(Utah 1915) (Offset for general benefits denies equal protection because landowner must
contribute all potential benefits from improvement, while similarly situated neighbors are not
required to contribute to project.) (citing Beveridge v. Lewis, 67 P. 1040 (Cal. 1902)); City of
Paragould v. Milner, 170 S.W. 78, 79 (Ark. 1914) (interpreting ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 22 and
ARK. CONST. art. 12, § 9 as permitting the offset of “local, peculiar, and special” benefits); Lake
Roland Elevated Ry. Co. v. Frick, 37 A. 650, 652 (Md. 1897) (disallowing offset of benefits
when condemnation brought by private railroad and market value of land increased as a result of
improved travel); Newman v. Metro. Elevated Ry. Co., 23 N.E. 901, 903 (N.Y. 1890) (Increase
of value resulting from the growth of public improvements, the construction of railroads, and
improved means of transit accrues to the public benefit generally, and the general appreciation of
property values cannot offset compensation to the injured landowner.); Meacham v. Fitchburg
R.R. Co., 58 Mass. 291, 297–98 (Mass. 1849) (allowing consideration of increase in market value
to particular remainder parcel caused by location of railroad on property but prohibiting offset for
general rise in property values surrounding railroad).
57 See, e.g., IOWA CONST. art. I, § 18 (Jury shall not consider any advantage that may result to
the landowner as a result of the partial taking in measuring just compensation.); OKLA. CONST.
art. II, § 24 (offset for special and direct benefits against the remainder parcel only); 26 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 706(b) (West 2014) (disallowing offset of future damages and general benefits
which will affect entire community beyond properties directly abutting project in calculating after
value of remainder); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.09(3), (6) (West 2013) (special benefits considered in
just compensation calculation, but no allowance for offset of general benefits).
58 See Peoria, Pekin & Jacksonville R.R. Co. v. Laurie, 63 Ill. 264, 266–68 (Ill. 1872)
(affirming judgment of no severance damages in condemnation proceeding in which condemnor
railroad proffered evidence regarding benefit to remainder and showed landowner suffered no
damages as a result of taking).
59 See Beveridge v. Lewis, 70 P. 1083, 1086 (Cal. 1902) (holding that general benefits may
not offset compensation insofar as applicable to private railroad corporations and overruling prior
California decision that permitted offset of general benefits against compensation) (overruled by
L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809, 816 (Cal. 1997)); see also
L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 941 P.2d at 816 (discussing addition to state constitutional
provision in reaction to “speculative computation of benefits” by private railroad enterprises to
preclude private railroad companies both from taking land without first compensating owner and
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Only Iowa absolutely precludes the offset of benefits or increased
value in calculating just compensation60 and a small minority of state
laws take the opposite approach, using the before and after rule and
permitting zero compensation.61 The majority of states utilize some
form of the special benefits doctrine to limit the circumstances in which
an advantage resulting from a partial taking may offset payment to the
landowner.62
B.

Responding to Free Appropriations: The Special Benefits Doctrine

The special benefits doctrine classifies benefits caused by a taking
as either “general” or “special” to the particular remainder parcel.63 The
most basic distinction between the two types of benefits differentiates a
general benefit shared by the community at large from a benefit that
directly enhances the value of the parcel in particular.64 Traditionally,
general benefits include such communal advantages as increased facility
of transportation, population growth,65 or a general appreciation in
property values around a municipal project; by contrast, special benefits
confer a unique benefit to the remainder parcel distinct from
neighboring parcels.66 A general benefit cannot offset the amount of
compensation or severance damages owed to the landowner, whereas a
special benefit may be credited against all or part of the compensation
award.67
By offsetting a landowner’s compensation by just the special
benefits that he received distinctly from his neighbors,68 the special
benefits doctrine was designed to accomplish two goals. First, the
doctrine would prevent a landowner from subsidizing a municipal
project with part of his property in exchange for general benefits that his

from setting off damages by benefits to remainder); Weston L. Johnson, Benefits and Just
Compensation in California, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 764, 765–66 (1969) (describing early California
rule as essentially eliminating monetary compensation for takings by railroads during 1870s).
60 See infra Part III.A.
61 See infra Part III.B.
62 See infra Part III.C.
63 See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 581–82 (1897).
64 Id.
65 Sullivan v. N. Hudson Cnty. R.R. Co., 18 A. 689, 690 (N.J. 1889).
66 See State v. Ahaus, 63 N.E.2d 199, 202 (Ind. 1945) (Special benefits render a landowner’s
remainder parcel more useful or convenient or otherwise confer a peculiar increase in value.); see
generally Bauman, 167 U.S. at 581–82; 4A NICHOLS, supra note 1, at § 14.03.
67 See Bauman, 167 U.S. at 581–82.
68 Id. (“[I]f the [taking] inure[s] to the direct and special benefit of the individual out of
whose property a part is taken, he receives something which none else of the public receive, and it
is just that this should be taken into account in determining what is compensation. Otherwise, he
is favored above the rest, and, instead of simply being made whole, he profits by the
appropriation, and the taxes of the others must be increased for his special advantage.”).
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neighbors received for free.69 Second, because general benefits did not
offset compensation for the taking, the doctrine would reduce the
frequency of zero compensation for injured landowners as compared to
the before and after method.70
Louisiana Highway Commission v. Grey71 illustrates the function
of the special benefits doctrine. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held
that the unique subdivision potential conferred to the landowner’s
remainder parcels by the partial taking constituted an offsettable special
benefit, rather than a general benefit to the entire community.72 The
condemnor appropriated 21.11 acres of land from the landowner’s 172acre farm to facilitate a highway construction project, leaving the
remaining property severed in two remainder plots.73 The court found
that the remainder parcels realized a unique benefit because the
farmland could be utilized as subdivisible parcels.74 The farmland was
the only property that was undeveloped in an otherwise suburban area
located near a growing city.75 The court applied the special benefits
doctrine to offset the value of the subdivision potential against the
landowner’s compensation because this landowner derived this
exclusive benefit over and above the general benefits of the project that
his neighbors received for free.
Nonetheless, the doctrine has developed some patent flaws since
its inception. First, many courts have developed conflicting definitions
of a special benefit, particularly when neighboring parcels share a
similar benefit from the taking.76 Second, jurisdictions offset special
benefits in different ways,77 which has created confusion in this area of
the law. Third, the special benefits doctrine may actually
overcompensate the condemnee at the expense of the taxpaying
public.78
69 See City of Maryland Heights v. Heitz, 358 S.W.3d 98, 106 (Mo. 2011) (allowing offset for
general benefits would effectively require landowner whose land was taken to subsidize project
that rest of community received at no cost) (citing 3 NICHOLS, supra note 1, at § 8A.02(1)); see
also State v. Midkiff, 516 P.2d 1250, 1254–55 (Haw. 1973) (special benefits doctrine avoids
unfairness of making one landowner pay in land for benefits that another receives free) (citing
Territory v. Mendonca, 375 P.2d 6, 13 (Haw. 1962); United States. v. 930.65 Acres of Land, 299
F. Supp. 673, 677–78 (D. Kan. 1968) (justifying narrow application of special benefits doctrine
with equitable principle that it is unfair to offset benefits to landowners when neighbors, whose
lands are not taken, receive same benefits for free); Louisiana Highway Comm’n v. Hoell, 140
So. 485, 486 (La. 1932) (reasoning that landowner should not bear more of cost of public
improvement and benefit than neighbor whose lands are not taken for public project).
70 See supra notes 46 and 59.
71 2 So. 2d 654 (La. 1941).
72 Id. at 660–61
73 Id. at 655.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 657.
76 See infra notes 101–103.
77 See infra Part III.C.
78 See, e.g., Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 544 (N.J. 2013) (abolishing
the special benefits doctrine and reasoning that injured landowner should receive just
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STATE SURVEY

No Credit for Increased Value: Iowa

The state of Iowa remains the only state to absolutely prohibit an
offset against compensation for increased value accruing to the
remainder parcel.79 This approach awards the largest possible
compensation because the landowner receives the full value of the part
taken plus the value of all damages incurred, without any offset
whatsoever.
In the seminal case of Frederick v. Shane,80 the state constitution
precluded the Supreme Court of Iowa from offsetting compensation or
severance damages by any benefit to the remainder parcel.81 At trial, the
landowner claimed $500 for damages arising from road construction on
a portion of his land, even though the State’s witnesses testified—and
the landowner conceded—that the road actually improved drainage on
the land and increased its market value.82 The lower court instructed the
jury to consider this improvement as an offset against the compensation
award, and the landowner appealed.83
The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed and cited to the “plain and
unmistakable” language of the state constitution as an absolute bar to
offsetting compensation.84 Under the state’s recently adopted
constitution, the court was required to award damages to the landowner
without reduction by the increased value to the remainder parcel.85
Although the previous state constitution permitted benefits to offset
compensation,86 the negative sentiment surrounding the free
appropriations by railroad companies during this period likely
compelled this shift in Iowa state law.87
compensation for his loss, but not a windfall at public expense).
79 See IOWA CONST. art. I, § 18; Johnson v. Des Moines Metro. Wastewater Reclamation
Auth., 814 N.W.2d 240, 246–47 (Iowa 2012) (“Before-and-after” requires the jury to measure the
difference in the fair market value of the parcel before and immediately after the taking, without
concern for any benefit caused by the public condemnation project.) (citing Jones v. Iowa State
Highway Comm’n, 185 N.W.2d 746, 750 (Iowa 1971)); see also Frederick v. Shane, 32 Iowa
254, 256 (Iowa 1871) (state constitution absolutely prohibits offset of benefits).
80 Frederick, 32 Iowa 254.
81 Id. at 255–56.
82 Id. at 254–55.
83 Id. at 255.
84 Id. at 255–56 (“Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation
first being made or secured to be made to the owner thereof, as soon as the damages shall be
assessed by a jury, who shall not take into consideration any advantage that may result to said
owner on account of the improvement for which it is taken.”) (citing IOWA CONST. art. I, § 18).
85 Frederick, 32 Iowa at 255–56. The condemnor cited to prior state cases that had permitted
such an offset, but the court rejected these authorities as inapplicable because they were
adjudicated under the old constitution. Id. at 256.
86 Id.
87 See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.
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The Before and After Method

A small minority of jurisdictions utilize the opposite approach
from Iowa, the before and after rule, which credits all benefits accruing
to the remainder against the total compensation award.88 In these states,
any benefit accruing to the remainder may offset compensation, whether
traditionally classified as general or special.89 Consequently, a
landowner does not receive any compensation if the partial taking
causes the remainder’s value to exceed net damages because the
increased value offsets the landowner’s severance damages as well as
the payment for the parcel taken.90
The Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed the use of the
before and after rule to offset benefits against total compensation in
Department of Transportation v. Rowe and held that the approach was
constitutional.91 In Rowe, the condemnor appropriated a portion of the
landowner’s property pursuant to a state condemnation statute that
codified the before and after rule in partial takings cases.92 The trial
judge entered a judgment on the jury verdict of zero compensation
because the increase in value to the landowner’s remainder parcel
exceeded the total net damages.93 The landowner appealed, and the
Court of Appeals ordered a new trial, holding that the state
condemnation statute constituted a violation of the North Carolina
Constitution because the statute allowed the fact-finder to credit both
88 This approach has been utilized in a small minority of states, including Alabama (see ALA.
CODE § 18-1A-170 (1975); State v. Huggins, 196 So. 2d 387, 390–91 (Ala. 1967) (citing Pryor v.
Limestone Cnty., 134 So. 17, 17–18 (Ala. 1931))); Arkansas (see Barnes v. Ark. State Highway
Comm’n, 664 S.W.2d 884, 885–86 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76–521
(Repl. 1981))); North Carolina (see Williams v. State Highway Comm’n of N.C., 114 S.E.2d 340,
344 (N. C. 1960)); and Kentucky (see Ky. Dep’t of Highways v. Sherrod, 367 S.W.2d 844, 853,
857 (Ky. 1963) (offsetting benefits because condemnor should not be required to pay more for
partial taking if remainder parcel’s value increases, notwithstanding fact that neighbor may
receive equivalent benefit for free)). Eminent domain scholars have also endorsed this approach
as the more logical compensation method. See Ky. Dep’t of Highways, 367 S.W. at 857 (citing
ORGEL, supra note 43, and NICHOLS, supra note 1, as support for the court’s use of the before and
after rule to offset benefits against the value of the part taken).
89 See supra note 88.
90 See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Rowe, 549 S.E.2d 203, 206 (N.C. 2001) (affirming a verdict
of zero compensation when special and general benefits accruing to the remainder exceeded
damages.); S. Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Mobile Cnty., 161 So. 2d 805, 806, 811 (Ala. 1963) (holding
that evidence sustained jury verdict of “No Dollars” damages in which benefits from two-year
easement on property exceeded damages); Posey v. St. Clair Cnty., 116 So. 2d 743, 746 (Ala.
1959) (affirming jury award of zero damages when remainder parcel increased in value due to
road construction).
91 549 S.E.2d 203.
92 Id. at 206 (“[J]ust compensation is ‘the difference between the fair market value of the
entire tract immediately prior to said taking and the fair market value of the remainder
immediately after said taking with consideration being given to any special or general benefits
resulting from the utilization of the part taken for highway purposes.’”) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 136-112(1) (1959)).
93 Id.
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special and general benefits against the landowner’s compensation.94
The Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected this argument and
reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision.95 According to the court,
permitting the fact-finder to consider all types of benefits ensured that
condemnees were put in the same financial position as they were prior
to the taking96 and avoided overcompensating the landowner for his
loss.97 If the court had not credited general benefits against the net
compensation award in this case, the condemnee would have received a
windfall consisting of full compensation for the part taken and any
increase in value to the remainder parcel caused by the alleged “general
benefits.”98
C.

The Special Benefits Doctrine In Practice

Those states that adopt the special benefits doctrine agree that any
general benefit resulting from a partial taking cannot offset the
landowner’s losses from the taking. Two significant differences,
however, divide the many states that embrace the doctrine. First, many
scholars99 and judges100 have criticized the doctrine because courts
define a special benefit differently, which has muddled the distinction
between special and general benefits. For instance, a Vermont court
defined a special benefit as peculiar to the remainder parcel, although

94 Dep’t of Transp. v. Rowe, 531 S.E.2d 836, 845 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (allowing general
benefits to offset market value of remainder violates constitutional requirement of just
compensation, which is unjust to condemnee and provides a windfall to the public).
95 Rowe, 549 S.E.2d at 207.
96 Id. at 210.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 See generally Connor, Jr., supra note 46 at 119; Haar, supra note 46 at 869 (“A certain
amount of diversity is doubtless inevitable, but even for us it is rare to have such a kaleidoscope
of rules pertaining to so narrow a subject as the various rules pertaining to the deductibility of
benefits from condemnation awards.”); Johnson, supra note 59 (proposing the adoption of a
straightforward before and after rule to measure just compensation in place of the special benefits
doctrine); Philip K. Jones, Jr., Comment, The Confusing Death of the Special Benefits Doctrine in
Louisiana Expropriation Law, 34 LA. L. REV. 820, 832 (1974) (“The more logical rule is to offset
all benefits.”).
100 Cf. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 540 (N.J. 2013) (discounting terms
special and general benefits as obscuring rather than illuminating the calculation of just
compensation); L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809, 818–20
(Cal. 1997) (concluding that difficulties in applying special benefits doctrine and lack of
justification for its continued use warrant rejection of the doctrine); State ex rel. State Highway
Comm’n of Mo. v. Koziatek, 639 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (referring to the distinction
between general and special benefits as “shadowy at best”); State By and Through State Highway
Comm’n v. Bailey, 319 P.2d 906, 927–28 (Or. 1957) (emphasizing the apparent inconsistences in
the special benefits doctrine in yielding to precedent and “reluctantly” applying the doctrine);
Gallatin Valley Elec. Ry. v. Neible, 186 P. 689, 690 (discussing the inability to harmonize the
definitions of the special benefits doctrine, although the court continued to apply the doctrine).
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the benefit does not have to be unique;101 a Washington court held that
benefits may be special even though other owners receive similar
benefits;102 and a South Dakota court held that special benefits must be
different in kind from any other landowner in proximity to the
project.103
Second, when courts determine that the benefit is special, they
disagree about how the special benefit offsets compensation. One
method credits special benefits against total compensation,104 which
effectively operates as the before and after rule in cases where special
benefits are found to exceed net damages.105 These jurisdictions differ
from those states that enlist the before and after rule106 in one pivotal
respect: these courts will not offset increased value resulting from
general benefits against compensation. However, when special benefits
increase the remainder parcel’s value beyond the landowner’s net
damages, this approach reaches the same result as the before and after
rule107 and awards zero compensation. The second method offsets
special benefits against only severance damages and requires
compensation for the part taken.108
A Washington case illustrates the first approach. In State v.
Templeman,109 the Washington Supreme Court utilized the special
benefits doctrine and awarded zero compensation by offsetting the
increase in value to the remainder caused by the partial taking against

101
102
103
104

Farrell v. State Highway Bd., 194 A.2d 410, 414 (Vt. 1963).
State v. Templeman, 693 P.2d 125, 127 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
State Highway Comm’n ex rel. State v. Emry, 244 N.W.2d 91, 96 (S.D. 1976).
See, e.g., City of Branson v. Estate of LaFavre, 9 S.W.3d 755, 758 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)
(special benefits may offset compensation for part taken and damages to remainder) (citing State
ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Tate, 592 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Mo. 1980) (en banc)); State v.
Hawkins, No. 91C-10-183(WTQ), 1995 WL 717407, at *2–3 (Del. Super. Ct., New Castle Cnty.
Nov. 22, 1995) (citing Acierno v. State, 643 A.2d 1328, 1332 (Del. 1994)) (same); E-470 Pub.
Highway Auth. v. Revenig, 91 P.3d 1038, 1042 (Colo. 2004) (en banc) (special benefits are valid
form of compensation under state constitution); Ky. Dep’t of Highways v. Sherrod, 367 S.W.2d
844, 857 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963) (special benefits may offset payment for part taken); Rudder v.
Limestone Cnty., 125 So. 670, 675 (Ala. 1929) (same).
105 See infra notes 109–117 and corresponding text.
106 See supra Part III.B.
107 See, e.g., Templeman, 693 P.2d 126 (affirming compensation of $0 for partial taking when
value of special benefits exceeded damages); Petkus v. State Highway Comm’n, 130 N.W.2d
253, 254 (Wis. 1964) (affirming jury award of no damages when evidence showed value of
remainder was worth more after taking than net damages and increase in value to remainder
constituted special benefit); State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Mattox, 307 S.W.2d 382, 384
(Mo. 1957) (holding jury award of zero damages for parcel taken not a result of prejudice when
condemnor provided substantial evidence that landowners would receive special benefits in
excess of damages); Smith v. City of Greenville, 92 S.E.2d 639, 644 (S.C. 1956) (holding special
benefits to remainder could offset payment for part taken); State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n
v. Baumhoff, 93 S.W.2d 104, 106, 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936) (affirming jury award of no damages
when special benefits exceeded net damages for partial taking); McKeen v. City of Minneapolis,
212 N.W. 202 (Minn. 1927).
108 See infra notes 121–134 and corresponding text.
109 693 P.2d 125.
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compensation for the part taken.110 The State condemned portions of
two separate parcels totaling 66.73 acres as part of a highway project,
for which the condemnee claimed compensation valued at $8,888 for
the portion on one parcel and $402,000 for the portion on the other.111
The State’s expert testified that these remainder parcels would actually
increase in value by $298,960 and $2,927,740, thus exceeding the value
of the taken parcels and entitling the landowner to zero compensation
for the partial taking.112 The jury subsequently returned an award of
zero dollars to the condemnees113 because Washington law permits the
offset of special benefits against the total compensation award.114
On appeal, the condemnees asserted that the increase in value to
the remainder parcel did not constitute an offsettable special benefit
because the landowner’s remainder parcel was not the sole recipient of
the benefit.115 The Washington Supreme Court rejected this argument
and construed the increase in market value to the remainder parcel as a
special benefit, despite the fact that neighboring parcels shared the same
increase in value.116 The court affirmed the award of zero dollars and
noted that the value of the remainder increased sevenfold due to the
project.117
The second approach to the special benefits doctrine offsets special
benefits against severance damages, but not against payment for the part
taken.118 This approach operates like the value plus damages
compensation method, so an injured landowner would receive
compensation for the part taken even if special benefits from the taking
exceeded his net damages. Although this approach is common, courts
utilize different definitions of a special benefit to reach the same
result.119 The following two cases are illustrative of decisions in which
the court offset special benefits against only severance damages but did
so by defining the benefit more broadly than a unique advantage on the

110
111
112
113
114

Id.
Id. at 126.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 127 (benefits offset against any and all compensation and damages (citing WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 8.04.080)(West 2014)).
115 Templeman, 693 P.2d. at 126–27.
116 Id. at 127 (increase in market value constitutes special benefit) (citing Spokane Traction
Co. v. Granath, 85 P. 261 (Wash. 1906)).
117 Id. at 128 (noting annexation, rezone, and city plans to extend utilities to the property as
benefits directly resulting from the highway project).
118 See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 24, 27 (Alaska 1990) (special benefits may offset
damages) (citing ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.55.310(a)(3) (West 2013)); City of Orofino v.
Swayne, 504 P.2d 398, 400–01 (Idaho 1972) (special benefits cannot offset compensation for the
part taken); State Through Dep’t of Highways v. Bitterwolf, 415 So. 2d 196, 200 (La. 1982)
(statutory prohibition against offset of benefits applies only to part taken, and not to offsetting
damages to remainder) (referencing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2633 (2012)).
119 See supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text (different definitions of special benefit).
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particular remainder parcel.120
For example, Illinois courts broadly define a special benefit as any
tangible increase in market value to the remainder parcel—whether or
not the landowner shares the benefit with the community—and
guarantee compensation for the part taken.121 In Illinois State Toll
Highway Authority v. Heritage Standard Bank and Trust Company,122
the Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed an award for a partial taking for
full compensation for the taken parcel and zero dollars in damages
because the project caused the remainder to increase in value.123 The
condemnor appropriated 11.4 acres of land, leaving a remainder parcel
of approximately 29 acres for which the landowners claimed
damages.124 Two experts for the condemnor testified that the remainder
parcel incurred no damages from the taking because the project
provided improved accessibility to the parcel.125
The landowners appealed the jury award of $805,000 for the part
taken and zero damages to the remainder, alleging that the jury had
credited nonoffsettable general benefits against the damages award.126
The appellate court rejected their argument and stated that any
enhancement in market value caused by the public project constituted a
special benefit to the remainder.127 Under this reasoning, sharing the
benefit of increased market value with other parcels does not
automatically qualify the benefit as general because each parcel whose
value increases as a result of the project receives a special benefit,
irrespective of the project’s effect on surrounding properties.128
120 Compare La. Highway Comm’n v. Grey, 2 So. 2d 654 (remainder parcel received special
benefit as a result of unique subdivision potential as a result of the taking) with Farrell v. State
Hwy Bd., 194 A.2d 410, 413–14 (Vt. 1963) (special benefits must be peculiar to land directly
affected but do not have to be unique) and Templeman, 693 P.2d at 125 (special benefits may be
special even though other landowners receive similar benefits as result of highway improvement).
121 Illinois case law requires compensation for the part taken. See, e.g., Ill. State Toll Highway
Auth. v. Am. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 642 N.E.2d 1249, 1255 (Ill. 1994) (Longstanding measure of damages for part not taken is the difference between fair market value of
property prior to improvement and fair market value of property as affected by improvement.)
(citing Dep’t of Pub. Works & Bldg. v. Divit 182 N.E.2d 749, 753 (Ill. 1962) (emphasis added));
see also Kane v. City of Chicago, 64 N.E.2d 506, 508 (Ill. 1945) (Parcel actually taken must be
compensated in money, but damages to remainder may be offset by benefits occasioned by
taking.). Georgia exhibits similar flexibility by considering a tangible increase in market value as
an offsettable benefit against the remainder and likewise assures the “Credit Only Against
Severance Damages” outcome by requiring compensation for the part taken. See Fulton Cnty v.
Power, 137 S.E.2d 474, 477 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964) (benefits may not offset compensation for part
taken) (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 36-504)).
122 552 N.E.2d 1151 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
123 Id. at 1155.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1155–56.
126 Id. at 1157.
127 Id. at 1158.
128 Id. (citing Brand v. Union Elevated R.R. Co., 101 N.E. 247, 249 (Ill. 1913)); see also
Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. Boening, 107 N.E. 810 (Ill. 1915) (holding that special benefit results
when increase in market value accrues to remainder as result of project, and finding reversible
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The Tennessee Court of Appeals also required compensation for
the part taken and offset special benefits only against severance
damages in Maryville Housing Authority v. Williams.129 There, the
alleged benefits to the remainder parcel were also shared with
surrounding properties.130 These benefits could traditionally be defined
as general benefits because the remainder parcel shared the benefit of
the project—a municipal parking lot—with the public at large.131 The
trial judge adopted this view and held as a matter of law that the
municipal lot did not specially benefit the remainder parcel.132
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the award for $10,000 in
damages after the condemnor appealed, reasoning that the jury should
have been permitted to evaluate any evidence of benefits to the
remainder parcel.133 The opinion stated that access to public parking
could materially affect the market value of commercial properties, and,
therefore, the fact-finder should consider whether this municipal lot
conferred a special benefit on the remainder parcel.134
D.

The New York and California Approach

Several courts award value plus damages compensation and offset
severance damages by all benefits resulting from the taking, without
distinguishing between those that are special and general. This type of
compensation provides the best solution in cases in which increased
value to the remainder parcel exceeds net damages for two primary
reasons. First, this method avoids an award of zero dollars to the
landowner, who has physically lost a piece of property, because
compensation must be paid for the part taken in all cases. Second, it
ensures that the condemnor does not pay the landowner for undeserved
severance damages.
States such as New York135 use the terms “general benefit” and
error in jury instruction to exclude consideration of all benefits shared with other landowners).
129 478 S.W.2d 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971).
130 Id. at 67.
131 See, e.g., Hilliard v. First Indus., L.P., 846 N.E.2d 559, 565 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (“Special
benefits are those that accrue directly and solely to the landowner’s property.”) (citing Little
Miami R.R. Co v. Collett, 6 Ohio St. 182, 186 (Ohio 1856)); State Highway Comm’n ex rel. State
v. Emry, 244 N.W.2d 91, 96 (S.D. 1976) (noting that “for benefits to be deemed special, the
benefit to the remaining property must be different in kind from that of any other owner involved
in the highway improvement and that, though the benefits to various landowners affected may
differ in degree, it is not the degree of benefit that controls”).
132 Maryville Hous. Auth., 478 S.W.2d at 67. The jury thus disregarded any value conferred by
the municipal lot and awarded the landowners $16,350 for the part taken and $10,000 in damages
for the remainder at trial. Id.
133 Id. at 69.
134 Id.
135 See Chiesa v. State, 324 N.E.2d 329, 333 (N.Y. 1974); see also Michigan (see Dep’t of
Transp. v. Sherburn, 492 N.W.2d 517, 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (Proper measure of damages in
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“special benefit” to describe the types of advantages conferred on a
parcel136 but offset all benefits against severance damages. This
approach differs from the before and after rule137 because a landowner
always receives compensation for the part taken, even when the value of
the remainder exceeds net damages. It also differs from those
jurisdictions that utilize the special benefits doctrine138 because these
jurisdictions offset all types of benefits against severance damages.
The New York Court of Appeals accounted for all benefits
accruing to the landowner’s remainder parcel in Chiesa v. State,139 but it
limited the offset of these benefits to severance damages and required
compensation for the part taken.140 The court mandated payment for the
taken parcel even though experts for both parties agreed that the taking
increased the value of the remainder more than the landowner’s
losses.141
Both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals rejected the
condemnor’s argument that the remainder’s increased value should
offset compensation for the part taken.142 The Appellate Division
affirmed the award for the part taken and reasoned that any “so-called
windfall” to the landowner would not burden the taxpaying public
because the windfall would only materialize upon the sale of the
remainder parcel143 and not as part of the compensation award paid by
the condemnor. The Court of Appeals also affirmed.144 The opinion
regarded compensation for the part taken as the more equitable rule—
even when the value of the remainder increases as a result of the
taking—because the condemnor ought to bear the responsibility of
paying for the taken parcel.145
California reaches the same result as New York in partial takings
cases because the state does not differentiate between types of benefits

partial takings case consists of fair market value of property taken plus any severance damages to
remainder.)); New Mexico (see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42A-1-26 (West 2014); Yates Petroleum
Corp. v. Kennedy, 775 P.2d 1281, 1284–85 (N.M. 1989) (clarifying that any enhancement in
value to remainder may offset severance damages but cannot offset compensation for part taken));
Virginia (see VA. CODE ANN. § 25.1-230(A)(1) (West 2014) (increase in value to remainder shall
not offset value of property taken)); and West Virginia (see W. Va. Dep’t of Highways v. Bartlett,
194 S.E.2d 383, 389 (W. Va. 1973) (citing W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-2-9 (West 2013))).
136 The use of benefits language in the New York cases is likely a relic of early twentieth
century decisions that first encountered the question of benefits. See Chiesa, 324 N.E.2d at 331
(citing In re City of New York (Cons. Gas Co.), 83 N.E. 299 (N.Y. 1907) (New York rule for
calculating compensation in partial takings offsets special and general benefits.).
137 See supra Part III.B.
138 See supra Part III.C.
139 324 N.E.2d at 330.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Chiesa v. State, 43 A.D.2d 359, 361 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974).
144 Chiesa, 324 N.E.2d at 330.
145 Id. at 332–33.
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and no increase in value to the remainder can offset compensation for
the part taken.146 The Supreme Court of California announced the
market value rule after abolishing the special benefits doctrine in the
1997 case of Los Angeles County, Metropolitan Transportation
Authority v. Continental Development Corporation.147 California’s
market value rule offsets a remainder parcel’s increased value against
only severance damages and requires compensation for the part taken.148
The decision eliminated the special benefits doctrine in California
because the historical reasons behind the doctrine, including
uncompensated takings by railroads, were no longer prevalent.149
Moreover, the confusion surrounding the doctrine outweighed its
usefulness.150 The court held that calculation for severance damages
must include all relevant evidence concerning the remainder’s market
value,151 which offered a simpler method of calculating compensation
because the state courts would no longer struggle to distinguish between
types of benefits.
The case involved the condemnation of three separate interests in a
parcel that was located near a planned transit station.152 Although the
condemnee claimed severance damages to the remainder, the
condemnor argued that the remainder’s value would increase by
$3,760,000, based on evidence of the rise in property values
surrounding transit stations.153 The trial court refused to admit this
evidence, finding that the increase in value to the landowner’s parcel
was not a special benefit because all property values in the vicinity of
the project would increase.154 At the close of the trial, the jury awarded
the condemnee compensation for the part taken and severance
damages155—an enormous windfall—because the jury could not
consider the alleged $3,760,000 increase in market value to offset
severance damages.
The condemnor appealed and asserted that special benefits to the
remainder should offset severance damages, or in the alternative, that
the court should abolish the distinction between general and special

146 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1263.410(b) (West 2014) (if benefits to remainder exceed
damages to remainder, such excess shall not offset compensation for part taken).
147 L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp, 941 P.2d 809, 812, 823–24 (Cal.
1997).
148 Id. at 814 n.2 (noting that California’s current eminent domain statute requires payment for
the part taken).
149 Id. at 812.
150 Id. (concluding that courts’ difficulty in consistently applying the doctrine warranted
overruling prior California cases that distinguished between special and general benefits).
151 Id. at 824.
152 Id. at 811–12.
153 Id. at 813.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 812.
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benefits.156 The court accepted the latter argument and announced the
market value rule to replace the special benefits doctrine.157 The court
reasoned that the special benefits doctrine actually permitted a
landowner to pay less for a public project than his neighbors in some
cases if a landowner received severance damages for the remainder
unreduced by the increased value caused by any general benefits.158
Moreover, because California law requires payment for the parcel taken
in all partial takings cases, the concern regarding uncompensated
takings during the nineteenth century was no longer relevant.159
IV.

FUTURE APPLICATION OF THE HARVEY CEDARS MARKET VALUE
RULE
A.

Issues Solved by the Harvey Cedars Decision

New Jersey’s adoption of the market value rule successfully
alleviated several issues in partial takings cases. First, Harvey Cedars
offered some clarity on calculating compensation for a partial taking by
eliminating the special benefits doctrine.160 Second, it decreased the
likelihood of windfall severance damages by requiring that all factors
affecting the market value of the remainder be accounted for in
calculating damages for a partial taking.161
The special benefits doctrine had failed to solve many of the issues
that it was designed to prevent. In many cases, the injured landowner
must pay for the same advantage that his neighbors receive for free even
if the court uses the special benefits doctrine. This outcome occurs
when a court considers benefits shared with neighboring parcels along a
project to be “special,” notwithstanding the fact that the landowner does
not receive the advantage distinctly from his uninjured neighbors.162
Moreover, zero compensation persists under the special benefits
doctrine in those states that offset special benefits against total
compensation,163 further undermining the doctrine’s initial goal of

156
157
158
159
160

Id.
Id. at 822–23
Id.
Id. at 819–20.
Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 540 (N.J. 2013). The court’s new
approach would consider all measurable and tangible market value factors affecting the remainder
parcel (Id. at 543) based on what a willing seller and willing buyer would consider. Id. at 540.
161 Id.
162 See, e.g., State v. Templeman, 693 P.2d 125, 127 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (Special benefits
may be special even though other owners receive similar benefits.); Ill. State Toll Highway Auth.
v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 552 N.E.2d 1151, 1158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (same);
Maryville Hous. Auth. v. Williams, 478 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971) (same).
163 See supra Part III.B.
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preventing free appropriations.164 By removing the distinction between
special and general benefits, the Harvey Cedars approach provides
greater certainty because a court assesses all increases in market value
caused by the taking in the same manner.
New Jersey’s market value rule also succeeds in reducing the
windfall damages awards that may occur under the special benefits
doctrine. For example, the Supreme Court of Vermont granted such a
windfall under Vermont law in Farrell v. State Highway Board.165
There, experts testified to the increase in market value of the properties
surrounding the project and to the landowner’s parcel in particular.166
The jury found the value of the land taken to be $75,000 plus $45,000 in
damages to the remainder, which the jury reduced by $35,000 in
benefits.167 The condemnees appealed, asserting that any benefits
arising from the public project constituted non-offsettable general
benefits because the project increased the value of all surrounding
properties.168 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Vermont found for the
condemnees and remanded the case for a judgment based on damages of
$120,000,169 unreduced by any of the increased value caused by the
taking.
Farrell illustrates the significant issue of overcompensation that
the Harvey Cedars court addressed. While Vermont’s codified special
benefits law170 required the court to award the landowner more than he
lost from the taking, the market value rule would have reduced the
condemnee’s severance damages by the remainder’s increased value,171
reducing the landowner’s windfall.
The Harvey Cedars market value rule also precludes Iowa’s
approach, which wholly disregards any increase in value caused by the
partial taking.172 Under Iowa’s partial takings compensation method,
condemnees may receive windfall damages that place them in a more
164
165

See supra Part II.B.
194 A.2d 410, 411 (Vt. 1963) (partial taking for construction of a control access highway
interchange).
166 Id. at 412. The landowner’s parcel increased in value by $52,000, or fifty percent,
following the taking. Id.
167 Id. at 410–11.
168 Id. at 412–13.
169 Id. at 415.
170 Id. at 413–14 (general public benefits shall not be considered in calculating damages
(citing 19 V.S.A. § 221(2)).
171 Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 542 (N.J. 2013) (“The [condemnees]
could not receive a financial windfall—an award above fair market value—if the entirety of their
property were taken to build the dune, regardless of the positive benefits inuring to their
neighbors. It therefore makes little sense that they should profit from a partial taking of their
property.”); see also L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809, 822
(Cal. 1997) (“There is no guarantee that [the condemnee] shall derive a positive pecuniary
advantage from a public work whenever a neighbor does.”) (citing McCoy v. Union Elevated
R.R. Co., 247 U.S. 354, 366 (1918)).
172 See supra Part III.A (discussing the Frederick decision).
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advantageous position as a result of the partial taking and consequently
increase the costs of public projects.173 New Jersey’s market value rule
ensures that a remainder parcel’s enhanced value offsets any severance
damages and precludes a condemnee from receiving undeserved
damages at taxpayers’ expense.174
B.

Issues in Applying the Market Value Rule Under the Before and
After Approach

Notwithstanding the clarity that the Harvey Cedars decision
introduced to this area of the law, outcomes in these cases remain
uncertain because the Supreme Court of New Jersey left an open
question as to the application of the market value rule. The opinion
permits the lower courts to decide whether the before and after rule or
the value plus damages rule is the more “practical” approach in a
particular case.175 This open question permits two possible outcomes in
future cases. If New Jersey courts use the market value rule under the
before and after application, zero compensation will result in cases in
which the increased value to the remainder exceeds net damages. By
contrast, a value plus damages application of the market value rule
would guarantee compensation for the part taken under the same facts.
This Note proposes that New Jersey Courts apply the market value
rule in a manner consistent with New York and California.176 To reach
the same outcomes as New York and California, New Jersey courts
would consider all relevant factors affecting market value and require
payment for the part taken in all cases. This approach would succeed in
reducing the windfall damages awards that Harvey Cedars sought to
end,177 while also preventing uncompensated takings that can occur
under the before and after approach.178
Unlike the value plus damages approach, the before and after
method permits unfair treatment to the condemnee by
undercompensating him for his loss relative to his neighbors. The
landowner’s neighbors may experience the general rise in property
values associated with the construction of a public project without
173 See generally Haar, supra note 46 at 872 (arguing that higher compensation awards may
reduce the amount of funding available for construction, with significant long-term consequences
on job markets and commerce); Jones, Jr., supra note 99 at 834 (cautioning that permitting the
landowner to profit above his actual loss at the expense of the public causes the costs of public
projects to increase and thus disincentivizes these improvements).
174 Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 544; see supra note 171.
175 Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 543 n.8.
176 See supra Part III.D.
177 See Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 544 (injured landowner should receive just compensation
for loss but not a windfall at public expense).
178 See supra Part II.A (discussing uncompensated takings by railroads under the before and
after rule).
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relinquishing any of their own property to the project. However, the
injured landowner would pay for these same benefits with a loss in
property if the increased value from the project exceeds his losses
because the before and after rule allows zero compensation under these
circumstances.179 Just as the before and after rule undercompensates the
landowner, it simultaneously favors the condemnor by permitting an
appropriation of private property for a public project without
payment.180
Courts that utilize the before and after rule justify awards of zero
compensation by reasoning that payment for the part taken would
overcompensate the landowner when the remainder parcel’s increased
value exceeds his net damages.181 However, the majority of jurisdictions
have displayed a strong disinclination towards zero compensation—
courts developed the special benefits doctrine as a response to
uncompensated railroad appropriations during the nineteenth century,182
and modern courts either continue to use the doctrine183 or require
payment to the landowner for the part taken in all cases.184 Ultimately, it
seems intrinsically unfair that a condemnor could physically appropriate
land for a project without paying for its own gain and the landowner’s
corresponding loss.
The before and after rule could also motivate undesirable social
incentives. This rule may prompt condemnees to subdivide their land
before a taking because the compensation awards differ depending on
whether a partial taking or a total taking occurs. In a before and after
jurisdiction, the landowner receives full compensation for the fair
market value of the parcel taken when a total taking occurs.185 However,
in the event that the condemnor takes a piece of land for a partial
taking, the landowner does not receive any compensation for the taken
parcel if the remainder’s increased value exceeds net damages.186
Thus, under the before and after rule, whether the landowner
179
180

See supra note 90 and corresponding text.
See supra Part II.A (discussing uncompensated takings by railroads under the before and
after rule).
181 See supra notes 88 and 96–98.
182 See supra Part II.A.
183 See supra Part IV.A (discussing Farrell).
184 Cf. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.55.310(A)(3) (West 2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121122(A)(3) (2002); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1263.410(b) (West 2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7711(3) (West 2013); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 154–F (2014); MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP.
§ 12-104(b) (West 2014); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 37.120(3) (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 42A-1-26 (West 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-15-22(4) (West 2013); OKLA. CONST. art.
2 § 24; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-511(4) (West 2013).
185 See, e.g., Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 535 (N.J. 2013) (valuation for
total taking equals fair market value of the parcel as of date of taking); Almota Farmers Elevator
& Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 474 (1973) (market value for monetary
equivalent of parcel taken measured by price that willing buyer would pay in cash to willing
seller) (citing United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961)).
186 See supra note 90 (partial takings cases awarding zero compensation for the part taken).
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receives the value of his taken parcel depends on whether the taking is
defined as total or partial. These divergent compensation awards
incentivize subdividing to avoid the partial taking. For instance, a
landowner could subdivide his parcel into two halves, granting one half
to another owner. When the condemnor takes the first half, a total
taking occurs. Consequently, the landowner receives compensation for
the full market value of the part taken. The owner with the second half
after the subdivision reaps the benefit of increased value without
sacrificing property to the project.
The before and after method also increases the potential for
favoritism by government officials in deciding where to locate public
facilities. Officials may locate public projects to maximize benefits to
their preferred constituents if immediate neighbors are inevitably going
to receive disparate treatment under the before and after rule.
C.

A Proposal for Compensation in New Jersey Partial Takings
Cases

By contrast, applying the market value rule under the value plus
damages format, as used in California, offers a more equitable
compensation method because it ensures that the landowner receives
compensation for the part taken. Even though this approach requires
payment for the part taken in all cases,187 it would still reduce the
overcompensation that concerned the Harvey Cedars court by avoiding
undeserved severance damages awards.188 Because any increased
market value to the remainder would offset severance damages, the
landowner receives damages only if the remainder has actually lost net
value.
Requiring compensation for the part taken also removes both the
incentive to subdivide and favoritism by elected officials. The
motivation to subdivide decreases because the landowner will always
receive the value of the taken parcel, whether a total or partial taking
occurs. This approach also reduces favoritism because when the
condemnor is required to always pay for the appropriated parcel, the
condemnor is motivated to appropriate the least expensive land.
Concededly, this method awards the landowner compensation for
the part taken even when the increased value of the remainder exceeds
net damages.189 However, requiring compensation for the part taken
187 Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 543 (acknowledging that the court cannot devise a perfect
means to compensate an injured landowner, but emphasizing that market value rule offers the best
solution).
188 Id. at 544 (increase in value to landowners’ property, resulting from the taking, should
offset decline in value of property in order to avoid a windfall).
189 See, e.g., Chiesa v. State, 324 N.E.2d 329, 330 (N.Y. 1974) (landowner entitled to
compensation for the part taken even when enhanced value to remainder exceeds damages); L.A.
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presents only minor drawbacks when compared to zero compensation
under the before and after approach. First, any windfall awarded under
the value plus damages approach—in the form of compensation for the
part taken—still decreases windfall awards by precluding unnecessary
severance damages. Second, because the only windfall that a landowner
may receive would materialize upon sale of the remainder190—not
affecting the amount paid in compensation by the condemnor—the
landowner does not receive a windfall at the taxpayers’ expense.191
CONCLUSION
After the adoption of the market value rule in Harvey Cedars, New
Jersey courts maintain the discretion to use the rule under a before and
after method or a value plus damages method. The value plus damages
application offers the most benefits for all parties. This application
achieves a reduction in windfall damages awards and lowers the costs of
public projects, while also ensuring an equitable outcome to an injured
landowner by preventing condemnors from appropriating private lands
without payment.

Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809, 815 n.2 (Cal. 1997) (noting that
current eminent domain statute requires payment for the part taken).
190 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
191 Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 540 (injured landowner should receive just compensation for
his loss, but such compensation does not entitle him to a windfall at public expense).

